No Detention: Consensual encounters may involve investigative functions without necessarily converting the contact into a detention or arrest. Examples:
Obtaining personal identification information from a person and running a warrant check, so long as nothing is done which would have caused a reasonable person to feel that he was not free to leave, does not, by itself, convert the contact into a detention. (People v. Bouser (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1280; People v. Gonzalez (1985) 164 Cal.App.3rd 1194, 1196-1197; Florida v. Rodriguez (1984) 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 [83 L.Ed.2nd 165, 170-171]; United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544 [64 L.Ed.2nd 497].)
Asking for identification, by itself, is not a detention. (People v. Ross (1990) 217 Cal.App.3rd 879; People v. Lopez (1989) 212 Cal.App.3rd 289.)
But; retaining the identification longer than necessary is a detention, and illegal unless supported by a reasonable suspicion the detainee is engaged in criminal conduct. (United States v. Chan-Jimenez (9th Cir. 1997) 125 F.3rd 1324: The consent to search obtained during this illegal detention, therefore, was also illegal.)
Tip: Ask for identification, transfer the necessary information to a notebook without leaving the person's immediate presence, and promptly return the identification to the person.
"(M)ere police questioning does not constitute a seizure." (Desyllas v. Bernstine (9th Cir. 2003) 351 F.3rd 934, 940; quoting Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434 [115 L.Ed.2nd 389, 398.)
Walking along with (People v. Capps (1989) 215 Cal.App.3rd 1112.), or driving next to (Michigan v. Chesternut (1988) 486 U.S. 567 [100 L.Ed.2nd 565].), a subject while asking questions, but without interfering with the person's progress, is not a detention.
Asking a vehicle passenger to step out of the vehicle is not a detention. (Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) 434 U.S. 106 [54 L.Ed.2nd 331]; People v. Padilla (1982) 132 Cal.App.3rd 555, 557-558.)
Asking a person to remove his hands from his pockets (done for officers' safety), without exhibiting a "show of authority such that (a person) reasonably might believe he had to comply," is not, necessarily, a detention. (People v. Franklin (1987) 192 Cal.App.3rd 935, 941; In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3rd 1232.)
During a lawful search, although commanding a person to show his hands is a "meaningful interference" with a person's freedom, and thus technically a "seizure" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, it is such a "de minimus" seizure that, when balanced with the need for a police officer to protect himself, it is allowed under the Constitution. (United States v. Enslin (9th Cir. 2003) 315 F.3rd 1205, 1219-1227.)
"Flashlighting" or "spotlighting" a person, by itself, is not a detention. (People v. Franklin, supra; People v. Rico (1979) 97 Cal.App.3rd 124, 130; .)
However, see People v. Garry (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100, where it was held to be a detention when the officer spotlighted the defendant and then walked "briskly" towards him. (See also "Detentions," below.)
Inquiring into the contents of a subject's pockets (People v. Epperson (1986) 187 Cal.App.3rd 118, 120.), or asking if the person would submit to a search (People v. Profit (1986) 183 Cal.App.3rd 849, 857, 879-880; Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429 [115 L.Ed.2nd 389].), does not necessarily constitute a detention, so long as done in a manner that a reasonable person would have understood that he is under no obligation to comply.
Even a consensual transportation to the police station is not necessarily a detention. (In re Gilbert R. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1121.)
A consensual encounter does not become a detention just because a police officer inquires into possible illegal activity during an otherwise unintimidating conversation. (United States v. Ayon-Meza (9th Cir. 1999) 177 F.3rd 1130.)
Contacting and questioning a person without acting forcefully or aggressively will, in the absence of any other factors which would have indicated to a reasonable person that he was not free to leave, be a consensual encounter only. (United States v. Summers (9th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3rd 683, 686.)
Generally, a conversation that is nonaccusatory, routine, and brief, will not be held to be anything other than a consensual encounter. (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 328.)
Displaying a badge, or even being armed, absent active brandishing of the weapon, will not, by itself, convert a consensual encounter into a detention. (United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194 [153 L.Ed.2nd 242].)
Contacts on buses, as long as conducted in a non-coercive manner, do not automatically become a detention despite the relative confinement of the bus. (United States v. Drayton, supra; Florida v. Bostick, supra.; see below.)
During a "knock and talk:" Contacting a person at the front door of their residence, done in a non-coercive manner, is not a detention. (United States v. Crapser (9th Cir. 2007) 472 F.3rd 1141, 1145-1147.)
Drawing a person out of his residence by simply knocking at the door and then stepping to the side for purposes of insuring the officer's safety; No detention when the officers then contacted him outside. (People v. Colt (2004) 118, Cal.App.4th 1404, 1411; "The officers did not draw their weapons. (Defendant) was not surrounded. No one stood between (defendant) and the room door. No one said that (defendant) was not free to leave.")
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